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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the two lines of decision can be reconciled to a large extent by mak-
ing the burden of proving prejudice or absence of prejudice depend upon the
specific nature of the error complained of, and the facts of the case as a whole,
as they appear on the record. Attempts have been made to state a more exact
rule which will throw the burden on one party or the other according to the
nature of the error and other circumstances. Some of these statements are in
substance as follows: depriving the defendant of a substantial right raises a
presumption of prejudice, Territory v. Prather, 18 N. M. 19, 145 P. 1086 (1915) ;
if the record as a whole shows a material error, prejudice will be presumed,
unless it appears from the record that the error was harmless, Miller v. State,
174 Ind. 255, 91 N. E. 930 (1910); probable prejudice must be shown by ap-
pellant before a conviction will be reversed, State v. Driscoll, 106 Ohio St. 33,
138 N. E. 376 (1922). Contrast with this last rule that stated in State v. Sage
(N. J. 1923) 122 A. 827, that the record must show that error was, or might
have been prejudicial. F. W. F. '27.
CRIMINAL LAw-DouBLE JEOPARDY-IDENTITY OF OaFENsEs.-Defendant, driv-
ing an automobile, hit two girls simultaneously, killing one and injuring the other.
He was acquitted of manslaughter for the death of one, and later tried for
atrocious assault on the other. Held, plea of autrefois acquit was good under
the circumstances; where several persons are injured by the same act, only
one, if any, crime is committed. State v. Cosgrove, (N. J. 1927) 135 A. 871.
The nicety of the distinction between cases where injuries to more than one
person result from what is in law a single crime, and those where substantially
the same act constitutes several crimes against different persons, has led to some
conflict of authority. Where several persons are killed or injured in the same
affray, but by separate shots or blows, the authorities agree that more than one
crime has been committed, and an acquittal or conviction of one homicide
or assault does not bar a subsequent prosecution for another. Augustine v.
State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 59, 52 S. W. 77, 96 A. S. R. 765 (1899) (acquittal) ;
State v. Temple, 194 Mo. 228, 92 S. W. 494 (1906) (conviction). A few cases
hold that, even where the identical shot or blow injures several persons, there
may be a prosecution for a separate crime for each person injured. Vaughan
v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 273 (1821); Commonwealth v. Browning, 146
Ky. 770, 143 S. W. 407 (1912). But by a slightly larger number of cases the
contrary conclusion is reached, at least where the first prosecution results in
a conviction. State v. Damon, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 387 (1803) ; Clem v. State, 42 Ind.
420, 13 Am. Rep. 369 (1873); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 466, 46 S. W.
639 (1898). On the other hand, there are cases which go so far as to hold that,
even though several persons are killed or wounded by distinct shots, only one
crime has been committed, if the shots are fired in such rapid succession as to
be practically continuous, and there is no intention to commit distinct acts of
violence. Moss v. State, 16 Ala. App. 34, 75 So. 179 (1917) (acquittal on first
trial); Fews v. State, 1 Ga. App. 122, 58 S. E. 64 (1907) (conviction on first
trial). This seems to be the case especially where the shots are fired in self-
defense and both of them hit persons other than those for whom they were
intended. State v. Houchins (W. Va. 1926) 134 S. E. 740 (acquittal). But
State v. Corbett, 117 S. C. 356, 109 S. E. 133, 20 A. L. R. 328 (1921) is contra,
though the shots were alleged to have been fired in self-defense. (See also
note, 20 A. L. R. 341, and cases cited.) The rule for determining when the
defense of double jeopardy may be pleaded is usually stated to be, whether
the proof of facts alleged in the one indictment would sustain a conviction on
the other indictment. Commonwealth v. Browning, supra. But such cases as
Moss v. State, supra, apply the test of whether there was an intention to in-
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flict separate injuries; and the application of this test, in People v. Warren,
1 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 338 (1852), leads to the result that where two persons
are killed by the same act of poisoning an acquittal of the poisoning of one
is no bar to prosecution for the poisoning of the other, because there was a
separate intent to poison each victim.
As to whether there may be more than one prosecution, as for separate as-
saults, where the defendant shoots at one person and hits another instead,
there is another conflict of authority. For the view that such prosecutions
would constitute double jeopardy, see Spanell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 418, 203
S. W. 357 (1918) ; for the contrary view, see People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App.
225, 233 P. 88 (1925). The preponderance of authority seems to favor the
former holding. (See also note, 2 A. L. R. 606, and cases cited.)
F. W. F. '27.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INTOXICATING LiQuos.-Plaintiff
arrested and part of his stock seized under warrant issued six days previously,
with no evidence of any unavoidable delay in the service thereof. Held, that
process must be executed in reasonable time where no time is named in pro-
cess or law authorizing it, and intoxicating liquors seized under a search war-
rant so delayed in service is inadmissible as evidence. State v. Wiedeman,
(Ill. 1926) 154 N. E. 432.
The matter of what constitutes a reasonable time is regulated in many states
by statute, and penalties are imposed on officers who fail to comply with the
requirement. In states where the period of reasonableness is not regulated by
statute, it is determined according to the circumstances of the case, such as
the distance to the place to be searched, the condition of the roads, the facil-
ities for travel, and the demands made upon the time of the officer. If there
is any delay, it must be entirely unavoidable. In State v. Guthrie, 38 Atl. 368,
where the delay was three days, and could not be explained, the warrant was
held void. In Weston v. Carr. 71 Me. 356 a delay of more than 24 hours was held
unreasonable.
All searches and seizures must be reasonable (Const. Art. 2, Sect. 6), and
a search made under a warrant which has become functus officio, by reason
of its not having been served until six days after it was issued, is not rea-
sonable. Link v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 778; CORNELIUS ON SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURES, sect. 141. Where intoxicating liquors have been obtained under a search
%arrant not meeting the requirements of the Constitution, they will not be
admissible in evidence. All the authorities seem to be agreed on these points,
and the Supreme Court of Missouri unhesitatingly confirms them in State v.
Hude, 297 Mo. 213. D. C. J., '28.
EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMoNY-ADMISSIBILITY OF DECEPTION TESTS.-In a
prosecution for rape the deposition of a doctor that he administered a "truth-
telling serum" to the defendant and while under its influence the defendant
denied guilt was offered in evidence on behalf of the defendant. The testimony
was excluded. Held, the evidence was properly excluded as unworthy of con-
sideration. State v. Hudson, (Mo. 1926), 289 S. W. 920.
The past two decades have witnessed increasing interest in the results of
scientific study of human behavior. In the field of criminology only tentative
deductions have been made and none of the deception tests yet devised support
a claim of infallibility. Suggested tests are the "association word and time
reaction"; the "respiration" or "internal excitement"; the "galvanometric"; and
the "systolic and diastolic blood-pressures." For a discussion of these see,
William M. Marston, "Psychological Possibilities in the Deception Tests," 11
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